The death of senior Daesh commander Abdallah Makki Mosleh al-Rafi’i (alias Abu Khadija), announced on 14 March 2025, would appear to mark another milestone in Daesh’s continuing operational decline in Iraq and Syria. Abu Khadija had amassed a multitude of different functions for Daesh, suggesting both a dearth of competent leadership figures within Daesh, and highlighting the significant impact his death will likely have on the organisation.
Dearth of competent leaders
As the latest UN report highlighted, Abu Khadija was one of the top leaders within Daesh’s global network, responsible for several key functions. The assessment concludes that he led the two offices responsible for overseeing activity in Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the wider Levant. Most significantly, Abu Khadija was also the Head of the General Directorate of Provinces and the Delegated Committee. It was in this capacity, as the so-called “Emir” of Daesh’s most senior decision-making body, that Abu Khadija was the man responsible “for operations, logistics, and planning conducted by ISIS globally, and directs a significant portion of finance for the group’s global organisation.”
Assessments indicate that whereas once Daesh was able to disperse authority widely to a cadre of leadership figures, today responsibilities are necessarily more concentrated. Since the loss of its final slivers of territory at Baghouz more than five years ago, Daesh no longer enjoys the same permissive operating space in the region, or ability to claim it can enact governance. The group’s numbers have been decimated by an aggressive tempo of strikes by the Coalition and its security partners, whilst its propaganda no longer appears capable of inspiring new individuals to fill its ranks. The UN suggests that its financial reserves in Iraq and Syria have dwindled, while reporting indicates that it has struggled to pay its existing fighters, let alone offer cash inducements to new recruits.
These developments appear to point to a growing dearth of individuals at the top of the organisation capable of leading it, with the few who remain caught in a spiral of mistrust. It was this context which likely caused an excessive consolidation of power in the hands of a single individual, a weakness that will become apparent now that Abu Khadija has been killed.
The “Caliph” – an empty position
The elimination of Abu Khadija may prove even more consequential than initially apparent. While officially subordinate to the ‘caliph’, evidence indicates Abu Khadija was the true architect of Daesh’s strategy and operations. This assessment is supported by the group’s deliberate obscuring of their caliph’s identity since 2019 – a security measure that underscores the symbolic nature of the position while highlighting Abu Khadija’s role as the actual decision-maker.
According to Daesh’s own precepts, there are a number of qualifications for one to be deemed eligible for the position of “caliph”. Without knowing the identity of an individual laying claim to the role, it is impossible for members of Daesh to know whether they have pledged allegiance to a “qualified” individual. Moreover, many have suggested that being unknown (Majhul) in itself disqualifies one from proclaiming themselves as “caliph. Finally, even under Daesh’s own distorted theology, a “caliph” must be oversee meaningful territory, which Daesh no longer possesses.
Some have even argued that Abu Khadija was therefore happy to relinquish the meaningless title, knowing that the control of the organisation would remain in his hands. Furthermore, he probably selfishly (and wrongly) thought that the international community would be less focused on him and instead target the purported head of the organisation.
Some of the impact of the strike on Abu Khadija is likely to be immediate as Daesh scrambles to reorganise itself amongst the few remaining senior officials. However, there is likely to be a longer-term impact as the continued attrition of competent individuals further hollows the organisation out from the top down.